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1. Introduction 
Although the retirement decisions of older workers (especially men) have been widely studied,l much 
less is known about the joint labour force behaviour of older married couples. However this topic 
becomes important given the growing proportion of married women that approach old age with 
substantial work histories. A strong evidence of joint retirement patterns will have important 
implications for the analysis of the effects of any retirement policy. More specifically any policy that 
increases the incentive for one member of a married (cohabiting) couple to exit the labour force will 
have additional effects on the labour force behaviour of the other spouse. Among the different 
determinants of retirement such as economic variables or pension provisions, health related factors are 
bound to play a crucial role in retirement decisions of older couples.2 In fact, all the pension systems 
have specific treatment for people retiring because of health or disability reasons. Health status is 
particularly relevant in explaining joint retirement since sometimes one spouse has to withdraw from the 
labour market to care for the other one. Although there are a few studies on this issue using US data,3 
and despite its interest, only Blau and Riphahn (1999) present an analysis about joint retirement in 
Germany. 
Several reasons can justify the existence of joint retirement. First, there could be observable 
economic factors affecting both members of the couple and causing a positive correlation between 
retirement dates. Second, poor health or chronic illness may influence not only individual own 
retirement but may increase the necessity of care giving and, consequently, influence spouses retirement 
behaviour. Also unobservable factors highly correlated between husbands and wives (assortative 
matting) could originate such a correlation. Finally, strong complementarities between the husband and 
wife's leisure time would explain why couples tend to retire at the same time. 
In this paper we examine whether or not the pattern of joint retirement is a common feature of the 
European labour market and if so, which are the determinants of such behaviour. To understand 
retirement decisions and, among them, retirement of couples seems especially important when the 
sustainability of the actual pension systems is becoming a public debate in Europe.4 Any retirement 
policy to implement should account for cross-effects among the members of a couple. The sign of these 
cross-effects will depend on how the labour supply of the spouses interacts. Strong complementarities in 
leisure will induce one spouse to retire when the other does it while the opposite effect could be found 
when leisure for the members of the couple is a substitute. In the latter case if one spouse compulsory 
retires the other spouse could increase hislher labour supply to keep the household income at the original 
level (added worker effect). The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) provides a unique 
lSee for instance Stock and Wise (1990), Berkovec and Stern (1994), Blau (1994) or Gmber and Wise (1999). 
1nere are a few studies focusing on the effects of health status in an individual context. Some examples are Sickles 
and Taubman (1986), Bound et at (1999) or Dwyer and Mitchell (1999). 
3See Blau (1998), Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) or Hurd (1990) as good examples. All of them in one way or 
another include health-related variables in their models. 
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source of comparison across European countries that allow us to exploit individual and country specific 
differences relating retirement. The ECHP collects information on a wide range of socio-economic 
characteristics (personal and household demographic characteristics, labour force status, health status, 
etceteras) as described in the Appendix. 
Given the nature of the problem to analyse (uncertainties concerning the magnitude, timing, 
frequency of job offers and the duration of jobs), labour market histories are best described as 
realisations of a stochastic process. Within this framework, flow rates between labour market states are 
the object of study. A household utility function can be derived allowing for dependence of one person's 
strategy on the employment status of other household members. In such a setting the allocation of time 
and income is completely determined by the state occupied. A way to take into account the joint labour 
supply decisions for married couples is to consider the set of possible states the household can be in (for 
instance: both members working, wife working-husband non working, etceteras). Transitions from and to 
any of the possible states can be constructed and compared. As an advantage, this approach allows the 
labour market decisions of both spouses to be endogenous while controlling for observable and 
unobservable characteristics. 
Recent evidence shows that joint retirement is frequent among married couples. In fact, most of the 
applied papers using either US or European data (see Zweimiiller et ai, 1996 who use Austrian data, 
Blau, 1998 using US data or Blau and Riphahn, 1999 using German data) show clear indication of joint 
retirement due to correlation in unobservable effects or "assortative matting" (for instance, the effect of 
joint leisure or joint wealth in preferences). European evidence (Zweimiiller et aI, 1996 with US and 
Austrian data or Blau and Riphahn, 1999 using German data) shows that higher wages or earnings 
decrease the incentive to withdraw from the labour force. However, Blau (1998) finds contradictory 
results using US data. 
Concerning the effect of health variables on retirement, Blau (1998), using two simple indicators of 
the health status of both members of the couple, shows that poor health has a significant negative 
(positive) effect on entry (exit) rates, specially for the husband. Cross-spouse health effects are mainly 
small but there are interesting exceptions. For instance, when the wife is employed and the husband is 
not, poor health of the husband reduces the wife's exit rate by 16%. This suggests that the health 
insurance provided by the wife's employer may be specially valuable to a couple when the husband'.s is 
covered by the wife's plan and is in poor health. Bound et al. (1999) show that poor health lead older 
workers to withdraw from the labour force, but the earlier a health shock occurs, the less likely is to lead 
to labour force exit. Finally, Blau and Riphahn (1999) find that a subjective health satisfaction variable 
and the presence and degree of an officially recognised handicap have no impact on transition rates of 
men and women. A chronic disease increases the workers' incentives to leave employment. They also 
found asymmetric cross effects for this variable. 
4See Boldrin et al (1999) or Gruber and Wise (1999) as recent examples. 
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Among our results we find a strong evidence of complementary, but asymmetric, effects between the 
labour supply decisions of both spouses. It seems that the husband's decision affects more his wife's 
decision than vice versa, whatever the origin state of the spouse. Furthermore, we do not find evidence 
supporting the "added worker effect". With regard to health variables, we find, as in most studies, that 
own poor health provides both members of the couples with incentives to withdraw from the labour 
force. More importantly, the magnitude of these health effects depend on the labour force status of the 
spouse suggesting either complementarities in leisure or correlation in the unobservables of both 
spouses. Additionally, we find important and asymmetric cross-effects. In that sense, it is striking how 
crucial is the husband's health status in explaining joint retirement. Concerning demographic variables, 
self-employed or highly educated individuals have lower probabilities of leaving the labour force. 
Finally, work income also shows asymmetric effects with a general pattern of negative influence on the 
probability of leaving the labour force. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of the ECHP, the 
pension systems and the behaviour of individuals within the sample. Section 3 presents the empirical 
model to be implemented and Section 4 analyses the estimation results. The conclusions are elaborated 
in Section 5. 
2. Data and stylised facts on labour force behaviour of married couples in Europe 
2.1. The ECHP 
The data analysed in this paper comes from the ECHP and contains information for 12 European 
countries. The focus of the ECHP is on household income and living conditions across EU12 countries. 
Eurostat achieves comparability across countries through a standardised design of the survey and 
common technical and implementation procedures, with centralised support and coordination of the 
national surveys. Time comparability is achieved by keeping the time between successive waves for a 
given country close to a calendar year and by keeping the questionnaire similar from one wave to 
another as much as possible. Information about the sample size, response rates and attrition rates is 
showed in Table 1. 
The structure of the data is described in Figure 1. The interviews are collected at some point during 
the year (1994, for wave 1, and 1995, for wave 2) and the questionnaire concentrates in the current 
individual and household information as well as on detailed information about previous calendar year. 
As the interviews were made almost at any month during the year depending on the country and the 
wave, one way of homogenising the information is to use the retrospective information to analyse the 
labour market transitions. In this way, transitions from one labour status to another will refer to the same 
span of time for every country instead of referring to the interview date that vary across countries and 
waves. In addition, income variables refer also to the previous calendar year, and therefore concentrating 
on transitions of this type seems more appropriate. 
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Table 1. Number of Household, non response and attrition in waves 1 and 2 
Wave! Wave 2 
COUNTRY Sample Response Sample Response Attrition 
Size Rate Size Rate Rate 
Germany 5054 48 4753 91 8 
Denmark 3482 62 3225 83 12 
Netherlands 5187 88 5110 89 9 
Belgium 4189 84 4012 87 10 
Luxembourg 1011 41 962 94 6 
France 7344 79 6722 90 11 
UK 5779 72 4548 84 23 
Ireland 4048 56 3584 82 14 
Italy 7115 91 7128 91 5 
Greece 5323 90 5219 89 9 
Spain 7226 67 6521 87 12 
Portugal 4881 89 4955 90 4 
EU12 60819 72 56700 87 10 
Austria na na 3382 68 
EU13 na na 60062 
Source: ECHP Data Quality (Eurostat) 
na: not available. Austria was not part of the sample in 1994. 
Response rate: proportion successfully interviewed of households eligible for interview in the given wave. 
Attrition rate: refers to households as approximation from the attrition rates for longitudinal sample units (individuals) 
Figure 1. Data Structure 
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The paper concentrates on information from waves 1 and 2, the ones available at the moment, and 
excludes from the analysis two countries: Austria, for which the panel contains only one wave of 
information, and the Netherlands, which does not contain any retrospective question in its questionnaire. 
That gives us two complete years of information about job status transitions, income and individual and 
household characteristics including health related variables. 
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2.2. Some lessons from the data 
A close observation to the data provides some useful information that should be accounted for when 
proposing an empirical model to estimate. Evidence on the behaviour of males, females and couples is 
presented in this section. 
In principle, every individual could be in any of three states: working, unemployed or out of the 
labour force. Figure 2 shows the age profile of the labour force activities in wave 2 (1995) for males and 
females in the twelve European countries considered. For males (Figure 2.a), the age profiles of labour 
force activities have similar shapes in all the countries. For females (Figure 2.b) some differences among 
Northern and Southern countries can be appreciated. Nevertheless, given the similar shapes of the age 
profiles, the figure suggests that a joint analysis for Europe can be implemented once correcting for 
country specific factors. It is also interesting to point out how the exit from the labour force is somehow 
quicker for Europe than for the US (see, for instance, Peracchi and Welch, 1994) as a more stepper age 
profile predicts. 
Figure 3 shows the age profile of labour force transitions for males (Figure 3.a) and females (Figure 
3.b) for the joint sample of European countries. As a reference initial point in time is December 1993 
and the final point is December 1994. The central line shows the fraction of individuals that actually 
change labour force status between the two periods. It therefore uses only individuals with valid 
interviews in both waves. The upper and lower bounds correct for the existence of attrition.5 Both 
figures are similar the ones shown in, for instance, Peracchi and Welch (1994), who analyse the case of 
the US. Transitions from employment and unemployment to out of the labour force show the same age 
profile. A significant fraction of individuals, especially among males, start leaving the labour force 
before they are sixty years old. For both males and females, exit from the labour force picks at 60 and 
65, showing the age of early and normal retirement for most of the European countries considered. 
Unemployed individuals tend to retire more than employed. It is also clear from Figures 3.a and 3.b that 
once an older individual leaves the labour force it tends to remain inactive for the rest of herlhis life, 
there is not much re-entry to the labour force. 
From the broad picture presented in previous figures, we can concentrate now in the retirement 
decisions. Figures 3.a and 3.b suggested that with respect to retirement we can analyse transitions from 
participation to non-participation since the shape of the transitions from unemployment and employment 
were similar. Furthermore, it also showed that unemployment, despite being a clear pathway into 
retirement in most of the countries, could not strictly be considered a form of inactivity for older 
individuals,6 since it is a much less absorbing state. Therefore in Figures 4.a and 4.b we present the 
5The upper bound shows the transition profile if all individuals not interviewed in the second wave will have transit. 
The lower bound shows the transition profile if none of the individuals not interviewed in the second wave will have 
change the status. 
6Blau (1998) uses this definition of inactivity for older individuals in the US. 
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hazard rates to retirement for EU12 males and females, respectively. The origin state is participation and 
the destination is to be out of the labour force. Again, the similarities across countries are striking apart 
from some exceptions and in spite of the small sample size for some of the age ranges in particular 
countries. In general, the conclusions from the aggregate analysis hold for the disaggregated by country 
analysis: individuals start retiring before they are 60 although there are exit picks when they are 60 and 
65 year old. For females this retirement pattern is less clear, but there are also less observations for older 
women. 
All previous evidence suggest that when analysing exit from the labour force behaviour we need to 
look also to individuals younger than 60. The age of cut that we select is 55 and 50 years for males and 
females respectively. In our sample an individual is defined as retired when slhe declares herlhimself as 
SO,7 but also when given the age condition slhe is in another type of economic inactivity (e.g., house 
keeping). Furthennore, retirement is considered as an absorbing state, that is, once the individual enters 
in it slhe remains there forever afterwards. Thus we analyse transitions from any fonn of activity 
(employment or unemployment) to inactivity, defining this one as retirement. As a first approach we 
consider two moments in time: to, December 1993, and tJ, December of 1994. The reason for such 
simplification is the scarce and concentrated number of transitions that can be found in every quarter. 8 
Using these criteria we select a sample of couples to analyse joint retirement. As retirement is an 
absorbing state, for every couple at least one member must be participating in the labour force at to. That 
gives us a sample of 4639 couples with valid values for all variables in the analysis. Figure 5 presents the 
labour force participation for husbands (top left panel of Figure 5) and wives (top right panel) separately 
and jointly (bottom panel) for March 1994, a time point in the middle of the observation period, 
respectively. The profiles for husbands and for wives are similar to those presented in Figures 2.a and 
2.b. for respectively the whole sample of males and females. For husbands there is a gradual declination 
in employment from the age of 55. This declination is sharper for wives after 55. Trends in joint labour 
force status shown in Figure 5 indicate that the incidence of the husband working and the wife out of the 
labour force is roughly constant at about 40 per cent until the husband's age of 60, while the rate of both 
members working declines gradually during these ages. The incidence of wives working while their 
husband are out of the labour force remains almost constant at around 8 per cent until the husband is 70 
years old. This could be accounted for by wives considerably younger than their husbands.9 
It is crucial to answer how often does joint retirement occur. For instance, the probability of 
retirement is higher for males if their wives are already retired (21.64) than without controlling for the 
7 Alternative definitions of retirement combining the self-reported labour force status with the reception of old age or 
invalidity related benefits yield similar results although originate a substantial drop in the number of observed 
transitions. Approximately a quarter of the sample in self-reported retirement declares not receiving any old age 
benefit. Results using these alternative definitions are available from the authors on request. 
sA vailability of new data waves will help to overcome this problem allowing a more detailed monthly or quarterly 
transition analysis. Blau (1998) indicates some advantages and disadvantages of using monthly of quarterly versus 
annual data. 
9Blau (1998) presented similar evidence for the US. 
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wives' status (18.41). Furthennore, if the wife retires during the period considered (December 1993 to 
December 1994) the probability of the husband retiring increases up to 27.4 percent. For wives these 
figures are more striking: if the husband retires during the observation period the probability of 
retirement for the wife increases 16 percentage points lO (from 19.7 to 36.1 percent). Note that the 
influence of one spouse's labour force status in the transition from activity to inactivity of hislber couple 
is not symmetric, being women more sensible to the condition of their husbands. 
2.3. Retirement related to health variables 
From previous studies,11 health has revealed as one of the major determinants of labour force behaviour 
for older men and women. Poor health leads many older workers to withdraw from the labour force. 
However how to measure health is not a straightforward question. Retirement studies have commonly 
used global questions as "Does health limit the amount or kind of work you can perfonn?" or "How 
would you rate your health? Is it excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?". Bound et al (1999) show for 
the US that these measures can be endogenous to the labour force status as well as not measuring the 
actual level of health. Their approach implies the estimation of an unobservable index of health, 
thorough the observable self-reported health status, using as explanatory variables exogenous factors (as 
education and age) as well as more detailed health measures available in the data set they use, the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS). 
The ECHP does not contain as detailed infonnation as the HRS with respect to functional limitations 
or specific health conditions. It does however include additional questions to the traditional ones. In 
particular it records whether the individual has any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or 
disability. Individuals are also asked if they have been admitted to a hospital as in-patients l2 and how 
many times slbe has consulted a doctor a dentist or an optician13 during the past 12 months. Although all 
of these measures reflect only partially the actual individual health status they are plausible indicators of 
it. Our reduced fonn approach here consists on analysing the effect of those indicators on the retirement 
decisions instead of using them to estimate and predict a health index (see Bound et al., 1999). This 
makes maximal use of the available infonnation on health status.14 Additionally, to minimise the 
possible endogeneity of the health variables all of them refer to the previous year. A detailed description 
of the variables is contained in the Appendix. 
Does health influence joint retirement decisions? Table 4 describes the health status for couples 
according to the type of transition the couple made between December 93 and December 94. It is 
l<For the US Blau (1998) found that between 30.3 per cent and 40.6 per cent of couples exit the labour force within 
1 year of each other. 
llSee Sickles and Taubman (1986), Blau and Riphan (1999) or Bound et at (1999) as examples. 
lz-rhe number of nights spent in a hospital as in-patient are confidential information for Germany and therefore will 
not be used in this study. 
13Visits to a doctor, optician or dentist are aggregated for the first wave. 
14See Anderson y Burkhauser (1985) for details about measures and problems of health variable. 
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noticeable that individuals, especially males, who retire during that period or who are already retired 
seem to have poorer health than those who remain working. Also poor health condition of the husband is 
asymmetrically associated with joint retirement when both spouses are initially working. This could 
suggest that the wives tend to retire to provide care to their husbands. This is confirmed by Table 5, 
which presents the probability of retirement given the health condition and labour force status of the 
spouse. There is an increase in the probability of retirement of 2 percentage points for husbands and 
wives due to the health condition of the other spouse. This probability increases even more when 
conditioning on retirement of the spouse during the sample period of time and the effect is especially 
strong for wives. For males, although there is an increase in the probability of retirement, this is smaller 
than the increase without conditioning on health status of the wife. Undoubtedly, the fact that the 
husband is often the main contributor to family earnings helps explain this particular evidence. 
When the husband is working while the wife is out of the labour force, the proportion of wives with 
poor health indicators is higher when the husband retires. In fact this is the women's group with the 
poorest health indicators, suggesting again some kind of care provision from the husband. The reverse is 
also true when the wife is the one who is working although the differences on their husbands' health 
status are not that strong, being the wife own health status much worse in relative terms. In general 
terms, the health status of retired husbands with working wives is poorer than for the rest of males. Then 
it seems that the wife tend to remain in the labour market until she can, given her own health status, 
suggesting that health insurance provided by the wife's employer may be especially valuable for these 
couples. 
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Table 4. Health status by type of transition 
Origin state Both employed Husband employedlWife OLF Wife employed/Husband OLF 
Destination State Both employed Wife retires Husband retires Both retire Remain Husband retires Remain Wife retires 
Husband Age 59.66 60.77 61.56 64.20 60.18 63.42 62.76 66.36 
In good health 61.45 64.57 43.59 45.45 61.58 49.41 38.96 36.07 
Chronic condition 22.80 19.43 40.17 43.94 22.07 35.24 48.88 44.81 
Hampered in daily activities 21.45 18.29 31.62 36.36 20.13 34.45 45.57 46.45 
Admitted as in-patient 6.86 8.00 14.53 25.76 7.88 18.90 14.09 16.39 
Visits to doctor 1-5 times 59.23 62.86 59.83 53.03 55.56 53.35 43.65 44.26 
Visits to doctor >5 20.87 14.86 29.91 34.85 21.26 31.10 45.74 47.54 
Wife Age 55.50 57.68 57.15 61.09 57.61 60.60 57.2 61.63 
In good health 58.74 56.57 60.68 53.03 49.22 36.61 54.09 45.90 
Chronic condition 22.80 29.71 28.20 21.21 30.38 35.04 23.48 29.51 
Hampered in daily activities 22.03 26.86 23.93 24.24 31.73 39.17 24.00 30.05 
Admitted as in-patient 7.73 7.43 6.84 10.61 10.36 11.81 5.04 10.38 
Visits to doctor 1-5 times 57.29 53.14 61.54 51.52 51.32 50.00 52.70 48.63 
Visits to doctor >5 29.95 31.43 23.93 28.79 35.02 39.76 35.45 37.16 
Both chronic condition 9.37 8.00 11.97 13.64 10.90 17.72 15.83 16.39 
N. OBSERVATIONS 1035 175 117 66 1853 508 575 183 
Table 5. Probability of retirement between December 1993 and December 1994: conditional to spouse retirement and health status 
Wife poor health Husband poor health 
Retired between Wife poor health Retired between Husband poor health Unconditional 
Dec 93-Dec 94 Dec 93-Dec 94 
Husband 24.36 20.97 27.95 18.41 
Wife 22.53 41.30 21.76 19.71 
. . .. Poor health: mdlVldual suffenng from a chrome condItIOn or bemg adlTIltted as m-patient m a hospItal 
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3. Empirical specification 
No controls for personal or household characteristics have been considered in the evidence presented 
in the previous section. To do so, an empirical fully parametric specification is proposed in this one. We 
assume that preferences are given by a household utility function. Savings behaviour is exogenous in this 
context given the difficulty of empirically modelling savings and labour supply jointly15. In such setting 
the allocation of time and income is completely determined by the state occupied, as Burdett and 
Mortensen (1978) showed. Each member of the couple can be participating or not participating in the 
labour market. Participating must be understood as being working or unemployed but looking for job and 
not participating collects people in any other situation. Therefore, the household as a whole can be in 
any of the four following states: 
1 = Both spouses participating 
2 = Husband participating, wife non participating 
3 = Husband non participating, wife participating 
4 = Both non participating 
Transitions from and to any of the four states can be then constructed producing a matrix of 
transitions as below. 
MATRIX! 
Joint destination State 
Joint origin state 1 2 3 4 
1 7r12 (X;/312 ) 7r13 (X;/313 ) 7r14 (X;/314 ) 
2 Not considered Not considered 7r24 (X;/324 ) 
3 Not considered Not consid~red 7r34 (X;/334 ) 
4 Not considered Not considered Not considered 
Transitions implying a re-entry in the labour force from non-participation are not considered here 
since we assume non-participation (retirement) is an absorbing state. Each element of the matrix, 7rij' 
represents the probability of making a transition from state i to state j at time t. In a reduced form, these 
probabilities depend on the demographic and economic characteristics (age, education, income, country 
specific legislation ... ), Xi, that shape the latent comparison of utilities that originates a change of status 
15See B1au (1998) or Martfnez-Granado (1998), among others, for similar specifications when dealing with the 
labour supply of couples. On the other hand, Diamond and Hausman (1984) present an analysis about the 
relationship between retirement and savings. 
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and on a vector of parameters, /3, which parameterises them. This specification allows for state 
dependence, that is, the effect of the variables varies with the origin and destination states. 
In principle quarterly or monthly transitions could be considered and duration in every state used as 
an explanatory variable (duration dependence). However, as mentioned above, the span of time is not 
long enough to avoid the problems derived from the concentration of transitions on some particular 
months. Therefore we choose a simpler approximation by ignoring the transition time and concentrating 
only on the destination to which exit took place. We look at the origin state at to (December 1993) and 
compare it with the destination state at t] (December of 1994). Then we have in effect a qualitative 
response model. Two waves of data are not enough to control by couple specific unobservable heterogeneity, 
therefore estimation of the matrix above, when assuming transition intensities of the proportional Weibull 
form, is equivalent to estimate three separated equations conditional on the origin state: 
1. When the origin state is that both spouses are on the labour force, identification of /312, /3/3 and /3l4 
reduces to estimate a multinomiallogit in the second period. We consider the following states: both 
spouses participating, the husband participating and the wife not, the wife participating and the 
husband not and both spouses out of the labour force. 
2. When the origin state is that the husband is in the labour force while the wife is not, identification of 
/324 comes from estimation of a logit on the second period over two states: the husband in the labour 
force and the wife out and both retired. 
3. When the origin state is that the wife is in the labour force while the husband is out, identification of 
/334 follows the estimation of a logit on the second period over the corresponding two destination states. 
An alternative to the family utility model sketched above wiII be to specify a bargaining model of 
intrahousehold allocation, as the one in Browning et al (1994).16 This approach imposes much stronger 
data requirements and will be left for further research. To implement such model two alternatives, 
among others, can be chosen. From the bargaining model two equations of labour force participation can 
be derived, one for the husband and one for the wife. There must also be a sharing rule determining the 
allocation of time and goods between them. As long as the age difference between the spouses or the 
difference in income expected after retirement could be variables which affect the sharing rule. On the 
one hand the two equations affected by the sharing rule could be jointly estimated. On the other hand we 
could leave unspecified the sharing rule and estimate jointly the two equations allowing for correlation 
and theoretical restrictions among them. This last approach imposes stronger coherence restrictions 
although is easier to identify. The advantage of this line of research over the model presented in this 
paper is that it does not impose a reciprocal influence of the labour force status of both spouses. This 
16 See Blundell et al. (1999) for a collective approach to labour supply, which takes account of participation and 
heterogeneity. 
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would be relevant if for instance the wife labour force decisions are affected by her husband's ones but 
the reverse is not true. 
4. Results 
Before presenting the results for couples, we estimate individual retirement models for males and 
females. In particular, conditional on working at to, we estimate, in the second period, a logit separately 
for males and for females. These results are discussed in Section 4.1, while the results for couples are 
presented in section 4.2. The Data Appendix gives a detailed discussion and definition of the variables 
used in the analysis. Although we claim for a reduced form model, we are aware that most of the 
variables are possibly endogenousl7 and therefore correlated with the error term. We use variables dated 
at period to. This allows us to consider them predetermined at to. given the initial labour force status and, 
under the null of absence of correlation in the errors. 
4.1. Individual estimations. 
The individual Logit results for males and females are shown in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. Three 
sets of estimates are presented. IS First two columns in each table are the estimates for the whole sample 
of males older than 54 and females older than 49 (5032 and 4171 observations respectively) using 
country dummies as explanatory variables. The third and fourth columns present the same specification 
by replacing the country dummies for country specific variables as defined in the Data Appendix. Last 
two columns show the estimates for a subsample of workers not self-employed.19 
Starting for the male estimation, results are quite similar whether excluding or not self-employed 
individuals. First of all there is a strong quadratic (concave) effect of age. However the effect at early 
ages (before 60) is still of great importance, since the population at risk is larger. Additionally the effect 
of the dummies for ages 60 and 65 is very strong and significant showing the general pattern of 
retirement for Europe that we saw in Figure 4. The more the household depends on the male for survival 
the smaller the probability of retirement is. This can be seen through the negative and significant effect 
of variables such as being the head of the household, household size or individual income relative the 
household income, whether from work or non-work private sources. Marriage and specially 
separationldivorce/widowhood seem to have a positive effect on the probability of exiting the labour force. 
17 See Bound et al (1998) for an instrumental variable treatment of the endogeneity on self-reported health variables, 
or Blau (1998) for endogeneity of income variables. 
18 A separate estimation for every country was implemented but most of the variables could not be identified because 
of the small sample size for many countries. For a comparison grouping the countries by north - south see Jimenez-
Martin (1999). 
19Self-employment represents on average 38 per cent and 20 per cent of the male and female workforce in this range 
of ages. It is a self reported status and further investigation on this aspect should be done. For some countries like 
Greece, Portugal or Ireland the figures for self-employed males amount to 65 per cent, 49 per cent and 55 per cent 
of the labour force respectively. These incredible high figures may reflect strong differences in the definition of the 
self-employment status. 
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Self-employment has a negative effect on the probability of retiring. Several explanations could fit 
that effect: lower replacement rate for self-employed individuals, more attachment to the labour market 
since they run their own businesses or impossibility of using the early retirement schemes in some 
countries, etc. To be unemployed in the origin state does not seem to have any effect on the probability 
of retirement for males. On the other hand, education influences negatively the probability of retirement. 
A higher degree of education is associated with less physical jobs and with particular preferences about 
leisure. The occupational dummies work in the same direction, being the manual workers (excluded 
category) prone to retire. 
The potential experience accumulated by the individual increases the probability of leaving the 
labour force. The more years the individual has already been working the easier to fulfil the 
requirements to get a pension. These eligibility conditions are hardly satisfied by foreign workers, which 
have, as a consequence, a lower probability of retiring. To hold a part time job also increases the 
probability of retirement, reflecting less attachment to the labour market or an intermediate position 
between full time work and retirement. 
Health variables show the expected signs: good health reduces the probability of retirement while a 
chronic illness or being admitted as in-patient at a hospital increases it. To visit often a doctor is for 
males a clear sign of poor health, thereby increasing the probability of exiting the labour force. Notice 
that the self-assessed health variable is not significant after controlling by the remaining health indicators.2o 
With respect to the country specific variables, there are clear differences across countries. The 
omitted and comparison category when using country dummies is Germany. The results suggest that 
countries as Luxembourg, France or Italy have a much higher probability of retirement while countries 
as Portugal, Ireland or Denmark have a much lower one. These differences in countries are basically 
explained by the different regulations about retirement. When replacing the country dummies for 
specific characteristics of the countries much of the explanatory power is retained. The more significant 
effects are those of the normal retirement age and of the Social Protection Expenditure (SPE). The 
higher the normal retirement age in a country, the lower the probability of exiting the labour market is. 
On the contrary, the higher the per capita expenditure on Social Protection in a country the higher the 
probability of retiring. Puzzling enough the higher the life expectancy after 65 the higher the probability 
of exiting the labour market.21 
Turning now to the results for females in Table 5 they are in general worse determined than for 
males. Most of the effects hold apart from some differences that we shall comment now. The effect of 
marital status has the opposite sing than for males: single women seem to retire more than married or 
divorced ones. Unemployment in the initial period has now a positive effect on retirement: it is easier to 
2<>ntis is an important result since there is evidence on endogeneity of self-assesed health variables in retirement 
models (see Bound et ai, 1999). 
21 At the moment, results respond to a cross-section perspective. New data waves would make possible to exploit also a 
time series dimension accounting for changes in the countries regulation across time and improving the results. 
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retire once the woman is unemployed (discouragement, loss of contact with the labour market, etc.). 
Although the health variables work in the same direction than for males, the visits to the doctor do not 
seem to reflect a poor health condition and therefore have no effect on the probability of retiring.22 When 
using country dummies, the effect of country is similar to the one found for males. However these 
differences across countries are not well explained by regulation differences. When substituting the 
country dummies for the country specific variables we lose explanatory power as well as find not well 
defined effects for those variables. Therefore it seems that there are more behavioural differences among 
women than among men across Europe as was already suggested from Figures 2.a and 2.b in Section 2. 
4.2. loint estimation. 
Concerning the joint estimation proposed in section 3, we deal here with a discrete-choice model and 
therefore the parameter estimates are not directly informative. They appear in the Appendix and we 
concentrate here on the discussion of Tables 6, 7 and 8 that present simulations of the transition 
probabilities, based on the estimated parameters. The effects of a given variable on the transition 
probabilities from a particular state were simulated by computing transition probabilities for a reference 
couple23 and allowing changes on the variable which effects we want to assess. Table 6 show the 
simulation from the estimates of a logit conditional on the case in which the husband is participating and 
the wife is out of the labour force at period to. Table 7 contains the simulations for the logit conditional 
on the case in which the husband is out of the labour force and the wife is participating at period to. And 
finally, Table 8 present the simulations obtained from the multinomial logit conditional on the case in 
which both spouses were participating at period to using country dummies. In general results are 
coherent with the separate individual estimations presented above, although some new facts reveal from 
the joint estimation. 
Let us start with the retirement decisions of one member of the couple when the other is already 
retired (Tables 6 and 7). The more relevant effects are found through age, health status, job status in the 
origin period and the living arrangements of the couple. Age has, as expected, a strong positive effect, 
especially for women. The probability of the husband retiring increases from 7.2 per cent to 23.3 per 
cent as he ages from 55 to 60 years and to 55.4 per cent when he reach the 65 years of age. For wives the 
probability of retiring increases from 2.3 per cent to 28.1 per cent and to 43.4 per cent when she passes 
22Women have reasons for visiting the doctor which are not related to poor health and we cannot distinghish 
amongst them. Anyway, interations between age and the number of visits to the doctor were included in an initial 
specification in order to account for the different reasons driving women to visit the doctor (for example, maternity). 
However they were not significant and therefore are not included in the final specification. 
23The reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them with 
higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working lifes at 18, with no part-time 
job, none working in the public sector, none self-employed, living independently and without any other family 
member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are : 25 per cent wife income, 50 per cent 
husband income and no capital income. 
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from 52 to 60 and 65 years of age respectively. Cross-age effects although positive are relatively small, 
especially for males. 
Poor health influences strong and positively the exit rate from the labour market. For males a chronic 
health condition, to visit often the doctor and especially to be admitted as in-patient at a hospital are 
good proxies for poor health. For women, the visits to the doctor do no reflect a poor health condition, as 
mentioned above. Cross-spouse health effects are mainly insignificant with an interesting exception: 
when the wife is employed and the husband is not, poor health (a chronic condition) of the husband 
reduces the wife's exit rate by 24 per cent compared to good health.24 A close inspection of the data 
reveals that when the husband is out of the labour force because of health reasons (with a low level of 
benefits), the wife's work income becomes fundamental for sustaining the household. The positive effect of 
the dummy reflecting whether the husband receives any type of invalidity income reinforces that hypothesis. 
Although to be unemployed during the first period has in principle a negative and small effect, it 
turns to be positive when the individual is 60 or older. This reflects the prevalence of special early 
retirement schemes for unemployed individuals from the age of 60. Finally living arrangements 
influence clearly the probability of retirement for both, males and females. When the couple depends on 
other family members the probability of retirement increases drastically, especially for husbands. Also, 
when they cohabit with some family member depending on them there is a reduction in the probability of 
withdrawing from the labour market. 
With respect to the rest of the variables, self-employment, high education and individual work 
income relative to household work income are disincentives to retirement. A part time job during the 
first period or a high percentage of the household income coming from non-work sources accelerates the 
exit from the labour market. 
We turn now to the simulation for the probability of retiring when both spouses were working in the 
initial period (Table 8). There is a strong positive effect of age. Age not only affects own retirement but 
also the older the husband relatively to the wife the more likely that she retires and vice versa. In 
particular if the husband is 65 and the wife is 60 the probability of both retiring increases from per 
thousand to almost 50 per cent. It seems therefore that financial incentives generated by the Social 
Security system influences the joint retirement decisions: the members of the couple tend to postpone 
retirement until they are eligible for a pension?5 
Health status is other major determinant of retirement for working couples. However here we find an 
asymmetric effect between husbands and wives. While poor health of any the members of the couple 
increases their own probability of retirement, especially for husbands, poor health of the husband 
increases also the probability of both retiring. For example if the husband has really poor health (he has 
24Blau (1998) and Blau and Riphahn (1999) found similar cross-spouses effects for the US and Gennany 
respectively. 
25Hidedmann (1998) propose and estimate a model of Social Security acceptance for working couples for the US 
and obtain similar results. 
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a chronic condition, was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous year and visits often the 
doctor) the probability of both members of the couple retiring increases from 1 per thousand to 5.5 per 
cent. However, the wife's health status effect on the probability of joint retirement is almost negligible. 
Therefore when the husband leaves the labour market due to health problems, the wife (because of care-
giving reasons) is more likely to leave also the labour market. Finally, the probability of both retiring 
also increases when both members of the couple enjoy poor health. 
Some other variables as the job status at the initial period or the relative work income present 
interesting asymmetric effects. When one member of the couple is unemployed at the initial period he or 
she is more likely to retire. However when the husband is the unemployed one, also the wife tends to 
retire: there is a mild increase on the probability that she retires and a more important increase on the 
probability of both retiring. This is coherent with the absence of an added worker effect found for 
several European countries.26 The income effects go in the same direction. The higher the percentage of 
the household income any member of the couple earns, the less likely slbe is to retire. However, the 
husband income has a positive effect on the probability of retirement of his wife while the wife income 
has a negative effect on the probability of retirement of the husband. In any case, work income as well as 
non-work income act as a disincentive to joint retirement. The negative sign of the non-work income 
variable may reflect stronger labour market attachment. 
The living arrangements of the couple show a clear example of co-ordinated behaviour: to depend on 
other family members increases the probability of observing both members of the couple out from the 
labour market. Self-employment of any of the spouses reduces the probability of observing any of them 
retiring, in line with the results in Tables 4 and 5. 
Potential experience of the husband increases his exit from the labour market and the probability of 
both of them retiring, while the wife's potential experience increases only the probability of both of them 
retiring. This effect reflects again the economic incentives of the pension system: when both of them are 
more likely to be eligible for a pension the chances of joint retirement are higher. 
With respect to the country specific effects, Italy, France and Spain are the countries in which joint 
retirement is more likely to occur. The country specifie variables do not encompass well the differences 
between countries and further research should be done in this aspect. 
Before concluding it is worth to mention that the effect of most variables on the transition 
probabilities of any spouse depends on the job status of the other member of the couple. For example, a 
woman with strong health problems has a probability of retiring of 6 per cent when her husband is 
employed while it increases to 9.6 per cent when the husband is already retired. In the same way, the 
probability of a male retiring when his wife is working and he has strong health problems is lower than 1 
per cent but when his wife is already retired this probability increases to 28.2 per cent. Therefore there is 
evidence of a propensity among couples to spend leisure time together. Whether this effect is due to 
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some unobservable characteristics affecting both members of the couple or to complementarities in 
leisure is a question that can not be disentangled with the simple model estimated in the previous section. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine individual and couples retirement patterns within the EU12 using 
information from the first two waves (1994 and 1995) of the European Community Household Panel, a 
newly released Eurostat longitudinal Survey. In our analysis we pool the data from the different 
countries and control the differences between their labour markets and pension systems. In more detail, 
we control these differences by introducing either a set of country specific effects or a set of variables 
that capture the differences in the regulation and/or the characteristics of the popUlation. Our approach, 
despite some evident limitations, has important advantages: it permits, specially when more waves 
become available, to capture the effect of the regulation and to analyse the effect of changes in the 
regulations for some countries. 
Before describing the detailed results we want to stress that there is strong evidence of joint 
retirement behaviour for the EU12 countries. In particular, we find that a working spouse is more likely 
to retire the more recently the other spouse has retired. This effect is even stronger if the wife is the 
working spouse. 
At the individual level our results are in line with most of the recent literature in retirement 
behaviour. In particular, we find some behavioural differences (income and health effects) between 
males and females; the more the household depends on the male for survival the smaller his probability 
of retirement is; self-employed people have lower probabilities of leaving the labour force; highly 
educated individuals stay in the labour market for longer periods; the probability of retirement is 
important at early ages and peaks twice, at 60 and 65. Health variables, as founded in other recent 
studies, are very relevant in determining retirement behaviour, especially for males. 
As expected, there are strong differences between countries, which are well accounted for by the 
differences in regulation, specially in the cases of males. For females, the important behavioural 
differences across countries (essentially the difference North vs South) are not well captured, because of 
our data limitations. 
With respect to couples exiting from the labour force, the following features should be stressed. 
First, concerning the joint retirement decisions given that both members of the couple are participants at 
the beginning of the period, we have found, first, strong cross age effects, specially when both spouses 
reach the entitlement age. Second, as found in other studies, there is strong evidence against the added 
worker effect at older ages. Third, male health status has strong influence in his own decision and, more 
importantly, in joint retirement decisions. However, the reverse is not true, since female health status has 
26Several theories try to explain this fact: complementarities in leisure, assortative matting, a stigma effect for 
husbands depending on their wives and so on. See Martfnez-Granado (1998) for an application using UK data. 
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little influence in all the cases. This issue deserves further investigation since we believe that it may 
undercover an important income effect. Fourth, as previously commented, the self-employment status 
discourages retirement in all cases. Finally, we find important asymmetric effects of the relative work 
income variables. 
To finalise, we want to emphasise that the magnitude of the effect of some key variables (health, 
income or living arrangements) depends on the labour force of both members of the couples suggesting 
either complementarities in leisure or correlation in the unobservables of both spouses. 
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Data Appendix 
A. Variables. 
The variables included in the analysis can be grouped in four categories: 
1) personal and household characteristics: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
marital status: two dummies, one taking value 1 if the individual is married, and the other 
equalling 1 if the individual is separated/divorced/widowed 
a dummy for the individual being head of the household, dated in to. 
a dummy reflecting whether the couple lives as dependent in other households or any of the 
members is the head of the household and therefore they live independently, dated in to. 
age, its square, and two dummies, one for age being 60 and another for age being 65 to pick the 
exit spikes at those ages 
education: a dummy for the individual having a third level of education recognised 
foreigner: a dummy for individuals not being nationals of the country where they are, dated in to. 
household size, dated in to. 
* number of children in the household younger than 15, dated in to. 
2) health variables 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a dummy if the individual reports himself as having good health, dated in to. 
a dummy for individuals having a chronic physical or mental health problem, dated in t] (this 
information is not available for to). 
a dummy for individual was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous year 
two dummy variables for visiting the doctor between 1 and 5 times and more than five times in 
the year, dated in to. 
3) labour force status characteristics, all dated in to. 
* Potential experience: Age-Age at which the person started herlhis working life. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Dummies controlling for self-employment, unemployment, part-time job and, working in the 
public sector. 
Occupational dummies: professionals, clerks, services workers 
Dummy for the size of the job unit greater than 500 
Work income relative to household income (it includes employment and self-employment 
earnings as well as unemployment benefits). 
Non-work income relative to household income (includes capital and property rental income as 
well as private transfers) 
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* Invalidity income: dummy that equals 1 if the individual receives income from sickness 
pensions. Since this type of income is not directly observable for every country it also includes 
some other public pensions: educational, family related benefits and other personal benefits. 
4) Country specific characteristics 
* 11 national dummies 
* sex specific variables collecting different regulations and characteristics across countries 
i) life expectancy at 65: number of expected years to live over 65 
ii) Early retirement age 
iii) Normal retirement age 
iv) Social Protection Expenditure (in Euro per capita) 
v) Pension eligibility criteria 
vi) Minimum pension relative to work income 
In Tables A.l and A.2 below present the mean and the standard deviation for all relevant variables in the 
individual and joint samples. 
Table At. Descriptive statistics 
Male sample Female sample Males in Females in 
Couples sample Couples sample 
5032 Obs 4171 Obs. 4639 obs. 4639 Obs 
Mean st-dev. Mean st-dev. Mean St-dev. Mean St-dev. 
Transition to retirement 0.173 0.379 0.168 0.374 0.183(*) 0.387 0.197(#) 0.398 
Age 60.28 4.826 56.07 5.270 60.99 5.000 57.61 5.181 
Unemployment 0.093 0.291 0.086 0.281 0.073 0.260 0.038 0.192 
College education 0.158 0.365 0.136 0.343 0.147 0.354 0.073 0.260 
Good Health 0.599 0.490 0.569 0.495 0.555 0.497 0.509 0.500 
Chronic physical/mental health problems 0.244 0.430 0.244 0.430 0.287 0.452 0.279 0.449 
In-patient in a hospital 0.098 0.297 0.082 0.274 0.104 0.305 0.091 0.288 
Number of visits to the doctor 1-5 0.563 0.496 0.551 0.497 0.545 0.498 0.530 0.499 
Number of visits to the doctor >=6 0.225 0.417 0.322 0.467 0.265 0.441 0.340 0.474 
Potential experience 42.38 9.692 35.44 12.11 43.57 9.126 31.82 17.73 
Self employment status 0.379 0.485 0.200 0.400 0.330 0.470 0.111 0.314 
Part time 0.070 0.255 0.240 0.427 0.067 0.250 0.185 0.389 
Public employment 0.216 0.412 0.310 0.463 0.219 0.413 0.162 0.368 
Working in a 500+ firm 0.093 0.291 0.070 0.255 0.106 0.308 0.047 0.212 
Professional 0.259 0.438 0.270 0.444 0.257 0.435 0.139 0.346 
Clerks 0.054 0.227 0.138 0.345 0.056 0.230 0.076 0.266 
Services workers 0.053 0.224 0.158 0.365 0.052 0.223 0.103 0.304 
Non national 0.015 0.122 0.017 0.128 0.011 0.103 0.011 0.103 
Married 0.876 0.330 0.728 0.445 
Sep-divorced-Widowing 0.061 0.240 0.203 0.403 
Household size 3.083 1.464 2.682 1.303 3.091 1.351 3.091 1.351 
Living independently 0.936 0.245 0.936 0.245 
Number of children 0-15 0.113 0.447 0.079 0.358 0.080 0.371 0.080 0.371 
Head 0.913 0.282 0.444 0.497 
Work income relative to H'hold income 0.581 0.320 0.368 0.308 0.473 0.356 0.136 0.219 
Non-work income reI. To H'hold income 0.027 0.085 0.017 0.067 0.036 0.105 0.036 0.105 
Min benefits relative to work income 0.501 0.378 0.658 0.348 0.527 0.373 0.837 0.291 
Notes: (*) Over 3881 observations. (#) Over 2207 observations. 
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Table A2. Analysis of joint transitions within the couples. 
[Sample Husband Aged 55+ Wife 50+. Retirement is assumed to be an absorbing state.] 
To Both in Husband inl Husb.Outl Both out 
From Wife out wife in 
Both in 1035 175 117 66 
(74.3) (12.6) (8.4) (4.74) 
Husband In I wife out n.c. 1861 nc 514 
(78.4) (21.64) 
Husband Out I wife in n.c. n.c. 575 183 
(75.9) (24.1) 
Both out n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c 
Notes: (ne): not considered. 
B. Social Protection expenditures and pension systems in EU12 (1994-1995). 
Social protection expenditure (SPE), which include a large variety of programs or functions (old-age, 
survivor, disability, unemployment, etc .. ) represents a major part of public spending in all EU countries. 
Overall, in 1995, SPE amounted to 28.4 percent of GDP and 52.2 percent of total government 
expenditures in the EU. As a share of GDP, SPE is highest in Central and Nordic countries (above 30 per 
cent) and lowest in the Southern countries and Ireland (around 20 percent). The level of SPE per capita 
(measured in PPP units) also varies (practically proportionally to GDP per capita levels) between the two 
groups of countries mentioned (from under 2.500 PPP in Greece and Portugal and about 3.000 PPP in 
Spain and Ireland, to over 6.000 in Denmark, Luxembourg). The last two columns of Table A3 report the 
ratio of old age and survivors pension expenditures to SPE and to GDP. Excluding Greece, pension 
expenditures in 1995 amounted on average to 42.4 percent of SPE and 12.1 percent of GDP. In all EU12 
countries, except Ireland (which has the lowest fraction of elderly people), old-age and survivors 
pensions represent by far the largest component of SPE, ranging from 35.5 percent in Netherlands to 63 
percent in Italy (the country with the largest proportion of retired people). 
Table A3. Social protection expenditures in the EU, 1995 
SPE SPEp.c. Pension Expenditures 
Coun!!2: %GDP PPP'OOO %SPE %GDP 
Germany 30.4 5.8 40.8 12.0 
Denmark 34.3 6.3 36.6 12.6 
Netherlands 31.6 5.8 35.5 11.2 
Belgium 29.7 5.6 39.8 11.8 
Luxembourg 25.3 7.7 43.2 10.9 
France 30.6 5.5 40.7 12.5 
UK 28.5 4.5 38.0 10.4 
Ireland 19.9 3.2 24.9 5.0 
Italy 24.6 4.1 62.7 15.4 
Greece 21.0 2.3 n.a. n.a. 
Spain 21.8 2.9 44.1 9.6 
Portu~al 20.7 2.4 38.6 8.0 
EU15 28.4 4.8 42.4 12.1 
Notes: SPE: Social Protection Expenditures. In thousands per capita. 
Pensions expenditures: Old-age + Survivor functions. Source: Boldrin et al. (1999). 
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The pension system and its generosity 
There are two key types of pension systems: unfounded Pay As You Go (PA YG) and funded systems. 
All the EU12 are characterised by a first PAYG pillar, which differs across countries in their coverage 
and generosity. Simultaneously, on the top of this public first pillar, many EU countries have also a 
second pension pillar (voluntary or compulsory), with defined benefits (DB) or defined contributions 
(DC). On the top of these two pillars, there is a third private pensions pillar (which is still of limited 
importance in a vast majority of the countries considered). See, for instance, Boldrin et al (1999) for a 
comprehensive description of the EU15 situation. 
In Table A4 a set of variables that identify some of the differences in terms of the parameters that 
characterise public pensions and life expectancy (which determines the length of the period in which 
people receives benefits) in EU12 countries.27 There are not much differences in retirement ages (being 
Italy an important exception) or life expectancy (either at birth or at 65). However, there are important 
differences among countries in contributory rates, eligibility criteria and generosity. It is worth 
mentioning the differences in generosity of the "guaranteed" benefits. Belgium and Luxembourg provide 
the elderly with the highest level of guaranteed benefits and Greece, Portugal and Germany with the 
lowest. A clear relationship between the levels of guaranteed benefits and GDP per capita is found 
(Germany and Spain are notable exceptions). See Boldrin et al. (1999) or Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) 
for further comments of public pension replacement rates or generosity. 
Table A4. Country data in 1994-1995. 
Country Tax SPE Male Female Male life Fern. Life Early Normal Elegi- Minimum 
Euro EC. Life eXE. Life eXE. eXE at 65 eXE at 65 (F) (F) bilit~ Benefits 
Germany 42.6 5514 73 80 14.7 18.4 63 65 5 2768 
Denmark 51.3 6374 73 78 14.3 17.7 60 67 3 3472 
Netherlands 45.4 5536 75 80 14.8 19.1 65 65 0 3473 
Belgium 46.8 5052 74 81 14.8 19.1 65 60 0 7638 
Luxembourg 43.3 6674 74 81 14.6 18.7 60 65· 10 10440 
France 44.6 5500 74 82 16.2 20.6 60 60 0 5048 
UK 34.9 4649 74 79 14.7 18.3 65(60) 65(60) 4 4103 
Ireland 36.3 2873 73 79 13.9 17.4 65 65 3 3357 
Italy 40.7 4312 75 81 15.5 19.4 56(51) 61(56) 16 4759 
Greece 32.8 1645 75 80 16.1 18.4 60 65(60) 15 354 
Spain 34.8 3020 73 81 15.7 19.5 60 65 10 5087 
Portusal 36.1 2162 71 79 14.4 17.9 60 65(62) 15 1345 
Keys: Tax: Income and social contributions taxation. SPE: Social protection expenditure (in Euro per capita). 
Minimum benefits are given in 1995 PPS units. 
27The key parameters that characterise public pension systems are the contribution rates, the eligibility criteria, the 
early (if any) and normal retirement ages, the replacement rate, the indexation rules (to real wages or to nominal 
inflation), and the amount of survivors and orphans benefits. 
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Table A.S. Transition to joint retirement from Husband in I Wife out of the LF 
Variable Coef St-dev Coef St-dev 
Male age 0.168 0.060 0.160 0.059 
Male age-sq -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Female age 0.038 0.046 0.042 0.046 
Female age-sq -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Age 60 (male) 0.643 0.175 0.639 0.174 
Age 65 (male) 1.408 0.244 1.418 0.244 
Male unemployment -0.284 0.310 -0.335 0.325 
Male unemployment and Age >=60 1.211 0.376 1.221 0.374 
Female college education -0.743 0.325 -0.794 0.324 
Male College education -0.013 0.195 0.002 0.195 
Male pot. Experience 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.008 
Male part time 0.622 0.203 0.570 0.202 
Male working in PS 0.263 0.152 0.259 0.152 
Male self-employed -0.432 0.158 -0.439 0.157 
Household Size -0.249 0.060 -0.244 0.058 
Independent -1.914 0.203 -1.773 0.189 
Male Good Health 0.110 0.140 0.088 0.139 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems 0.451 0.142 0.447 0.142 
Male as in-patient in hospital 1.000 0.174 1.001 0.174 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor 0.175 0.166 0.164 0.165 
Male 6+ visits to a doctor 0.271 0.204 0.279 0.202 
Female Good Health -0.254 0.142 -0.270 0.140 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems -0.106 0.248 -0.084 0.247 
Female as in-patient in hospital 0.123 0.190 0.101 0.189 
Male Work income rei to H'hold income -0.787 0.420 -0.734 0.430 
Couple non-work priv inc. reI. to H'hold inc. -1.600 0.572 -1.618 0.569 
Female chronic problem X Male rei income -0.033 0.377 -0.068 0.376 
Female Age X Male reI. income -0.026 0.033 -0.027 0.033 
Fel!!.~le receiving invalidity inc0'.!l~ ________ -=-0.I~L ___ ~}89 -0.153 0.190 
Female life expo at 65 0.537 0.188 
Male Life expo at 65 -0.284 0.194 
Early retirement age -0.043 0.027 
Normal retirement age -0.100 0.046 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita) 0.000 0.000 
Male min benefits reI. To work income 0.072 0.279 
------------------- --
Denmark -0.816 0.440 
Belgium -0.456 0.363 
France 0.744 0.311 
UK -0.485 0.306 
Ireland -0.801 0.311 
Italy 0.383 0.266 
Greece 0.102 0.278 
Spain -0.348 0.265 
Portugal -0.483 0.276 
Intercept -0.643 0.748 4.793 4.551 
Observations 2361 
Log-L -941.4 -944.8 
Pseudo-R_sq 23.43 23.15 
Chi-sq 576.0 (38) 569.1 (35) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux) 
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Table A.6. Transition to joint retirement from Husband out I Wife in the LF 
Variable Coef. St-dev Coef. St-dev 
Male age 0.133 0.096 0.126 0.095 
Male age-sq -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 
Female age 0.068 0.090 0.059 0.090 
Female age-sq 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Age 60 (female) 1.523 0.330 1.522 0.326 
Age 65 (female) 1.233 0.494 1.142 0.472 
Female unemployment -0.295 0.464 -0.334 0.468 
Female unemployment and Age >=60 0.845 0.684 0.786 0.678 
Female college education -0.138 0.484 -0.092 0.485 
Male College education 0.221 0.385 0.307 0.378 
Female pot. Experience 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.009 
Female part time 0.338 0.232 0.364 0.234 
Female working in PS -0.339 0.291 -0.394 0.293 
Female self-employed -0.401 0.277 -0.463 0.272 
Household Size -0.099 0.106 -0.096 0.104 
Independent -1.367 0.400 -1.298 0.377 
Male Good Health -0.312 0.256 -0.318 0.252 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems -0.588 0.358 -0.577 0.354 
Male as in-patient in hospital 0.284 0.295 0.276 0.296 
Female Good Health -0.201 0.243 -0.203 0.238 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems 0.490 0.267 0.600 0.259 
Female as in-patient in hospital 1.277 0.401 1.240 0.401 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor -0.299 0.318 -0.338 0.313 
Female 6+ visits to a doctor -0.446 0.357 -0.437 0.352 
Female Work income reI to H'hold income -2.547 1.489 -2.667 1.536 
Couple non-work priv inc. reI. to H'hold income 0.828 1.343 0.976 1.326 
Male chronic problem X Female reI income 0.373 0.883 0.404 0.879 
Male Age X Female reI. income 0.085 0.077 0.082 0.076 
Male receivil!S invaliditxJE..~~me 0.499 0.316 0.602 0.304 
Female life expo at 65 0.723 0.348 
Male Life expo at 65 -0.286 0.273 
Early retirement age -0.031 0.043 
Normal retirement age -0.045 0.050 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita) 0.000 0.000 
Female min benefits reI. to work income -0.076 0.507 
Denmark -0.765 0.618 
Belgium -0.720 0.702 
France 0.404 0.432 
UK 0.591 0.504 
Ireland -1.331 0.948 
Italy 0.536 0.472 
Greece 0.432 0.487 
Spain 0.038 0.464 
Portugal -0.707 0.501 
Interceet -2.089 1.212 -3.602 4.435 
Observations 758 
Log-L -310.8 -313.8 
Pseudo-R_sq 25.8 25.1 
Chi-s9 216.2 (38) 210.3 (35) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux) 
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Table A.7a. Transitions to retirement from the labour force. A 4-state model. 
Husb. 1nl Wife out Husb out! Wife in Both of them out 
Variable Coef. St-dev Coef. St-dev Coef. St-dev 
Male age 0.071 0.099 0.043 0.121 0.287 0.192 
Male age-sq -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
Female age 0.134 0.084 0.044 0.096 0.126 0.139 
Female age-sq 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
Age 60 (male) -0.135 0.322 0.876 0.326 0.452 0.585 
Age 60 (female) -0.409 0.550 1.853 0.433 1.427 0.601 
Age 65 (male) 1.055 0.346 -0.085 0.508 1.611 0.482 
Age 65 (female) 0.556 0.729 0.391 0.807 -0.590 1.192 
Male unemployment 0.251 0.388 0.575 0.407 1.029 0.661 
Female unemployment 1.019 0.322 -0.032 0.443 0.089 0.702 
Male college education 0.163 0.314 -0.551 0.393 -0.479 0.715 
Female college education -0.376 0.423 -0.279 0.442 0.454 0.769 
Female potential experience -0.006 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.028 0.026 
Male potential experience 0.004 0.018 0.032 0.018 -0.003 0.022 
Female part time 0.852 0.206 0.274 0.251 0.481 0.388 
Male part time -0.459 0.405 0.447 0.374 -0.102 0.541 
Female working in PS -0.150 0.292 0.378 0.287 0.075 0.509 
Male working in PS -0.506 0.309 0.661 0.296 0.201 0.538 
Any of them self-employed -0.403 0.253 -0.205 0.308 -1.094 0.464 
Household Size -0.010 0.092 -0.067 0.120 -0.645 0.201 
Independent -0.158 0.763 -0.520 0.793 -3.909 0.806 
Male Good Health 0.082 0.222 -0.310 0.261 -0.392 0.419 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems -0.331 0.361 1.222 0.382 0.559 0.515 
Male as in-patient in hospital 0.318 0.348 0.492 0.351 1.429 0.458 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor 0.171 0.246 0.662 0.359 0.645 0.561 
Male 6+ visits to a doctor -0.184 0.344 0.881 0.424 0.707 0.671 
Female Good Health 0.135 0.223 0.373 0.276 -0.194 0.410 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems 1.326 0.456 1.084 0.549 -1.641 0.968 
Female as in-patient in hospital -0.333 0.372 -0.090 0.444 0.760 0.574 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor -0.042 0.279 -0.168 0.340 -1.100 0.481 
Female 6+ visits to a doctor 0.066 0.328 -0.608 0.406 -1.452 0.571 
Both chronic condition -0.845 0.480 -1.276 0.505 -0.021 0.822 
Female Work income relative to H'hold income -4.607 1.551 -2.090 1.606 -2.399 3.246 
Male Work income relative to H'hold income 0.917 0.739 -0.575 0.979 -4.969 1.676 
Couple non-work priv. inc. reI. to H'hold income -0.661 1.009 -1.528 1.523 -3.793 2.454 
Male Age X Female relative income 0.192 0.114 0.170 0.108 -0.236 0.242 
Female Age X Male relative income -0.062 0.067 0.016 0.089 0.201 0.124 
Male chronic problem X Female reI income 2.104 1.054 -0.855 1.009 2.321 1.713 
Female chronic ~roblem X Male reI income -0.924 0.662 -0.151 0.872 3.048 1.369 
Denmark -0.846 0.512 0.088 0.544 -0.012 1.175 
Belgium -0.225 0.705 0.835 0.806 -0.501 1.249 
France -1.434 0.702 1.764 0.516 2.400 1.001 
UK 0.124 0.406 0.347 0.503 1.007 0.950 
Ireland 1.236 0.473 -0.317 0.888 1.391 1.243 
Italy 1.286 0.427 1.436 0.529 2.222 0.997 
Greece 0.810 0.418 0.598 0.574 1.321 1.008 
Spain 0.670 0.472 -0.495 0.782 1.633 1.091 
Portugal -0.231 0.425 0.045 0.536 -0.295 1.019 
InterceEt -3.474 1.469 -5.262 1.756 -0.331 2.557 
Observations 1393 
Log-L 
-870.6 
Pseudo-R_sq 25.1 
Chi-s9 582.0 (144) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux); Omitted state: 
Both members working 
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Table A.7b. Transitions to retirement from the labour force: A 4-state model. 
Husb. 1nl Wife out Husb out! Wife in Both of them out 
Variable Coef. St-dev Coef. St-dev Coef. St-dev 
Male age 0.051 0.097 0.050 0.122 0.304 0.190 
Male age-sq -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
Female age 0.092 0.083 0.045 0.096 0.127 0.139 
Female age-sq 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.004 
Age 60 (male) -0.099 0.319 0.869 0.324 0.510 0.569 
Age 60 (female) -0.252 0.546 1.911 0.430 1.660 0.594 
Age 65 (male) 1.052 0.338 -0.085 0.507 1.547 0.474 
Age 65 (female) 0.372 0.703 0.595 0.818 -0.860 1.192 
Male unemployment 0.166 0.397 0.647 0.431 0.693 0.683 
Female unemployment 0.495 0.314 -0.119 0.452 0.026 0.706 
Male college education 0.297 0.309 -0.572 0.388 -0.495 0.708 
Female college education -0.220 0.414 -0.298 0.439 0.475 0.777 
Female potential experience -0.013 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.022 0.024 
Male potential experience 0.014 0.015 0.032 0.019 -0.005 0.021 
Female part time 0.794 0.202 0.261 0.253 0.547 0.391 
Male part time -0.359 0.406 0.480 0.374 -0.017 0.535 
Female working in PS -0.111 0.287 0.437 0.287 0.143 0.501 
Male working in PS -0.449 0.302 0.649 0.295 0.058 0.523 
Any of them self-employed -0.483 0.254 -0.257 0.314 -1.187 0.447 
H'old Size 0.115 0.087 -0.101 0.122 -0.560 0.194 
Independent 0.133 0.692 -0.162 0.673 -3.011 0.637 
Male Good Health 0.082 0.219 -0.287 0.259 -0.260 0.418 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems -0.308 0.348 1.186 0.382 0.562 0.512 
Male as in-patient in hospital 0.363 0.345 0.465 0.347 1.433 0.452 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor 0.157 0.243 0.679 0.357 0.703 0.551 
Male 6+ visits to a doctor -0.203 0.340 0.896 0.421 0.747 0.669 
Female Good Health 0.176 0.221 0.371 0.272 -0.139 0.413 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems 1.231 0.449 1.115 0.549 -1.530 0.938 
Female as in-patient in hospital -0.089 0.361 -0.142 0.442 0.883 0.572 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor -0.019 0.278 -0.152 0.334 -1.032 0.473 
Female 6+ visits to a doctor 0.084 0.327 -0.627 0.401 -1.471 0.568 
Both chronic condition -0.785 0.476 -1.276 0.504 -0.126 0.801 
Female Work income relative to H'hold income -3.678 1.569 -1.544 1.641 -3.000 3.363 
Male Work income relative to H'hold income 0.668 0.743 -1.004 1.043 -5.066 1.743 
Couple non-work priv. income reI. to H'hold inc. -0.712 0.991 -1.664 1.512 -4.063 2.480 
Male Age X Female relative income 0.216 0.111 0.172 0.109 -0.222 0.238 
Female Age X Male relative income -0.013 0.066 0.011 0.091 0.242 0.121 
Male chronic problem X Female relative income 2.045 1.001 -0.816 0.994 2.060 1.699 
Female chronic Eroblem X Male relative income -0.919 0.658 -0.153 0.878 3.147 1.362 
Female life expo at 65 0.435 . 0.275 0.491 0.406 0.777 0.530 
Male Life expo at 65 -0.615 0.352 -0.411 0.470 0.310 0.611 
Early retirement age -0.021 0.042 -0.032 0.049 -0.027 0.079 
Normal retirement age -0.163 0.091 -0.291 0.116 -0.008 0.153 
Social Protection Expenditure (in Euro per capita) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
min benefits reI. to female work income 0.103 0.444 -0.660 0.610 0.546 0.833 
min benefits reI. to male work income 1.273 0.502 0.777 0.594 -0.824 0.986 
Interce£t 12.163 9.531 15.041 11.704 -15.668 16.495 
Observations 1393 
Log-L -890.5 
Pseudo-R_sq 23.3 
Chi-s9 542.1 (138) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux); Omitted state: 
Both members working 
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Table 4. Male. Individual transition to retirement 
Variable Coef St-dev Coef St-dev Coef St-dev 
head -1.445 0.130 -1.442 0.130 -1.369 0.148 
married 0.290 0.188 0.263 0.187 0.263 0.232 
Separated-di vorced-widowed 0.407 0.237 0.392 0.236 0.468 0.293 
Age 0.275 0.037 0.273 0.036 0.193 0.055 
Age-sq -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
Age 60 0.808 0.128 0.813 0.127 0.946 0.149 
Age 65 1.469 0.182 1.484 0.182 1.789 0.253 
Unemployment 0.229 0.147 0.248 0.157 0.352 0.155 
High education -0.375 0.146 -0.361 0.145 -0.435 0.172 
Good Health -0.089 0.099 -0.073 0.099 0.010 0.125 
Chronic physical/mental health problem 0.563 0.100 0.551 0.100 0.707 0.126 
In-patient at a hospital 0.647 0.128 0.660 0.128 0.492 0.161 
1-5 visits to a doctor 0.139 0.123 0.154 0.122 0.143 0.158 
6+ visits to a doctor 0.345 0.148 0.363 0.148 0.306 0.187 
Potential experience 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.008 
Self employment status -0.389 0.120 -0.363 0.118 
Part time 0.686 0.144 0.674 0.144 0.356 0.207 
Public employment 0.467 0.123 0.467 0.123 0.481 0.130 
Working in a 500+ firm 0.785 0.150 0.763 0.149 0.821 0.157 
Professional 0.080 0.120 0.076 0.120 0.223 0.153 
Clerks 0.188 0.190 0.197 0.190 0.235 0.197 
Services workers -0.690 0.235 -0.676 0.234 -0.671 0.286 
Non national -0.983 0.447 -0.936 0.445 -1.621 0.567 
Household size -0.208 0.045 -0.188 0.043 -0.232 0.058 
Number of children 0-15 0.234 0.119 0.206 0.117 0.401 0.134 
Work income relative to H'hold income -0.812 0.156 -0.735 0.172 -0.802 0.212 
Non-wor~private income relative -1.414 0.548 -1.385 0.547 -1.208 0.810 
--------------
Life expo At 65 0.522 0.086 
Male early retirement age 0.053 0.037 
Female normal retirement age -0.105 0.029 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita) 0.000 0.000 
Pension elegibility criteria 0.056 0.020 
Minimum benefits reI. to work income 0.044 0.171 
---------------
Denmark -0.368 0.249 -0.502 0.289 
Belgium 0.673 0.252 0.672 0.285 
Luxembourg 1.194 0.453 1.620 0.510 
France 0.861 0.229 0.855 0.254 
UK -0.097 0.212 -0.084 0.238 
Ireland -0.599 0.248 0.147 0.291 
Italy 1.056 0.203 1.276 0.235 
Greece 0.663 0.211 0.492 0.280 
Spain 0.427 0.205 0.353 0.235 
Portugal -0.305 0.213 -0.093 0.253 
Intercept -3.556 0.468 -8.886 3.891 -3.161 0.591 
Observations 5032 5032 3123 
Log-L -1782.2 -1786.5 -1141.3 
Pseudo-R_sq 23.2 23.1 24.2 
Chi-sq 1079.0 (37) 1070.3 (33) 730.0 (36) 
Omitted: Germany Excluded: Nether. 
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Table 5. Female. Individual transition to retirement 
Variable Coef St-dev Coef St-dev Coef St-dev 
Head -0.766 0.123 -0.740 0.122 -0.816 0.148 
married -0.501 0.209 -0.494 0.206 -0.728 0.234 
Separated-di vorced-widowed -0.222 0.210 -0.181 0.207 -0.460 0.236 
Age 0.140 0.025 0.144 0.024 0.107 0.033 
Age-sq -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Age 60 1.285 0.166 1.169 0.162 1.401 0.188 
Age 65 0.855 0.284 0.843 0.278 1.267 0.456 
Unemployment 0.553 0.155 0.439 0.155 0.612 0.160 
High education -0.145 0.184 -0.103 0.182 -0.123 0.200 
Good Health -0.205 0.107 -0.077 0.104 -0.314 0.124 
Chronic physicaVmental health problem 0.229 0.113 0.217 0.110 0.224 0.130 
In-patient at a hospital 0.169 0.169 0.268 0.165 0.280 0.190 
1-5 visits to a doctor -0.201 0.141 -0.167 0.139 -0.343 0.163 
6+ visits to a doctor -0.139 0.161 -0.083 0.158 -0.415 0.187 
Potential experience 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.006 
Self employment status -0.300 0.129 -0.319 0.126 
Part time 0.431 0.106 0.416 0.105 0.432 0.120 
Public employment -0.293 0.133 -0.341 0.130 -0.361 0.142 
Working in a 500+ firm 0.165 0.188 0.137 0.185 0.122 0.194 
Professional -0.225 0.145 -0.142 0.144 -0.091 0.174 
Clerks -0.274 0.161 -0.199 0.160 -0.247 0.170 
Services workers -0.425 0.145 -0.408 0.142 -0.315 0.160 
Non national -0.203 0.401 0.058 0.390 -0.418 0.454 
Household size -0.140 0.053 -0.079 0.050 -0.133 0.063 
Number of children 0-15 0.302 0.142 0.176 0.139 0.276 0.175 
Work income relative to H'hold income -0.866 0.206 -0.620 0.230 -0.736 0.252 
Non-work Qrivate income relative -1.691 0.837 -1.594 0.818 -1.948 1.093 
Life expo At 65 0.051 0.073 
Female early retirement age -0.028 0.036 
Female normal retirement age -0.049 0.024 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita) 0.000 0.000 
Pension elegibility criteria -0.017 0.026 
Minimum benefits reI. to work income 0.328 0.193 
-
Denmark -0.210 0.266 -0.290 0.281 
Belgium 0.662 0.265 0.697 0.279 
Luxembourg 1.314 0.451 .1.214 0.498 
France 0.200 0.222 0.133 0.233 
UK 0.491 0.218 0.460 0.227 
Ireland 0.760 0.279 0.755 0.305 
Italy 1.066 0.224 1.000 0.242 
Greece 0.864 0.222 0.708 0.251 
Spain 0.632 0.234 0.559 0.260 
Portugal -0.492 0.231 -0.772 0.266 
cons -1.760 0.402 2.469 3.253 -1.332 0.464 
Observations 4171 4171 3353 
Log-L -1527.9 -1567.1 -1168.2 
Pseudo-R_sq 19.1 17.0 20.1 
Chi-59 721.5 (37) 643.2 (33) 610.8 (36) 
Omitted: Germany Excluded: Nether. 
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Table 6. Marginal Effect in Husband Retiring when the wife is already out of the labour force 
Prob. Effect (%) 
Reference 0.072 
Husband Age = 60 0.233 222 
Husband Age = 65 0.554 664 
Wife Age =60 0.079 10 
Wife Age =65 0.080 10 
Husband Chronic Condition 0.099 37 
Husband in-patient at hospital 0.160 121 
Husband visiting doctor >=5 0.084 16 
Previous Three 0.282 289 
Wife Chronic Condition 0.082 13 
Wife in-patient at hospital 0.102 41 
H. work history started at 28 0.072 -1 
Husband Unemployed at to 0.056 -23 
H. Unemployed and Age 62 0.345 376 
Husband Higher Education 0.072 -1 
Wife Higher Education 0.036 -51 
Husband Part Time 0.127 75 
Husband Public Sector 0.092 27 
Husband Self-employed 0.048 -33 
Household size = 4 0.045 -37 
Not independent 0.346 378 
H. relative income = 75% 0.059 -18 
H. relative income = 25% 0.088 22 
H. relative income = 0% 0.108 48 
Couple relative non-work income = 10% 0.108 48 
Wife receiving invalidity income 0.063 -13 
Denmark 0.033 -54 
Belgium 0.047 -35 
France 0.141 95 
UK 0.046 -37 
Ireland 0.034 -53 
Italy 0.103 42 
Greece 0.080 10 
Spain 0.052 -28 
Portugal 0.046 -37 
Note: the reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them 
with higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working Iifes at 18, with no 
part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-employed, living independently and without any other 
family member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are: 25% wife income, 50% 
husband income and no capital income. 
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Table 7. Marginal Effect in Wife Retiring when the husband is already out of the labour force 
Reference 
Husband Age = 60 
Husband Age = 65 
Wife Age =60 
Wife Age =65 
Husband Chronic Condition 
Husband in-patient at hospital 
Wife Chronic Condition 
Wife in-patient at hospital 
Wife visiting doctor >=5 
Previous Three 
Wife work history started at 28 
Wife Unemployed at to 
Wife Unemployed and aged 62 
Husband Higher Education 
Wife Higher Education 
Wife Part Time 
Wife Public Sector 
Wife Self-employed 
Household size = 4 
Not independent 
W. relative income = 75% 
W. relative income = 50% 
W. relative income = 0% 
Couple relative non-work income = 10% 
Husband receiving invalidity income 
Denmark 
Belgium 
France 
UK 
Ireland 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Prob. Effect (%) 
0.023 
0.034 
0.043 
0.281 
0.434 
0.017 
0.040 
0.044 
0.092 
0.018 
0.096 
0.019 
0.017 
0.076 
0.028 
0.020 
0.032 
0.016 
0.015 
0.019 
0.083 
0.013 
0.040 
0.068 
0.025 
0.037 
0.011 
0.011 
0.034 
0.040 
0.006 
0.038 
0.034 
0.024 
0.011 
49 
90 
1138 
1812 
-24 
78 
95 
307 
-21 
324 
-17 
-25 
235 
24 
-13 
39 
-28 
-33 
-18 
268 
-43 
74 
200 
8 
62 
-53 
-51 
48 
77 
-73 
68 
52 
4 
-50 
Note: the reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them 
with higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working lifes at 18, with no 
part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-employed, living independently and without any other 
family member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are: 25% wife income, 50% 
husband income and no capital income. 
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Table 8. Marginal effect for transitions from both working 
Wife Husband Retiring Both Both 
Retiring Retiring working 
Prob. Effect Prob. Effect Prob. Effect Prob. Effect 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Reference 0.0377 0.0087 0.0014 0.9522 
Husband Age = 60 0.0478 26.7 0.0381 340.2 0.0042 197.4 0.9099 -4.4 
Husband Age = 65 0.0457 21.1 0.1880 2070.1 0.0157 1020.6 0.7506 -21.2 
Wife Age =60 0.2430 544.3 0.0097 12.3 0.0425 2929.3 0.7048 -26.0 
Wife Age =65 0.2478 557.2 0.0155 78.6 0.0126 800.6 0.7241 -24.0 
Husband 65 and Wife 60 0.2942 680.2 0.2112 2337.9 0.4765 33847.1 0.0181 -98.1 
Husband Chronic Condition 0.0422 11.9 0.0324 273.6 0.0065 362.3 0.9189 -3.5 
Husband in-patient at hospital 0.0477 26.5 0.0193 123.0 0.0087 517.7 0.9243 -2.9 
Husband visiting doctor >=5 0.0289 -23.3 0.0285 229.0 0.0042 200.0 0.9384 -1.5 
Previous Three 0.0483 28.0 0.1278 1375.0 0.0549 3813.8 0.7690 -19.2 
Wife Chronic Condition 0.0781 107.2 0.0164 88.7 0.0015 8.0 0.9040 -5.1 
Wife in-patient at hospital 0.0236 -37.4 0.0055 -37.1 0.0036 159.7 0.9673 1.6 
Wife visiting doctor >=5 0.0352 -6.7 0.0032 -62.5 0.0004 -71.6 0.9612 0.9 
Previous Three 0.0598 58.6 0.0081 -6.1 0.0008 -45.9 0.9313 -2.2 
Both Chronic condition 0.0375 -0.4 0.0171 96.8 0.0069 388.6 0.9385 -1.4 
H. work history started at 28 0.0361 -4.3 0.0123 42.5 0.0070 401.1 0.9445 -0.8 
Wife work history started at 28 0.0398 5.7 0.0165 90.4 0.0052 269.2 0.9385 -1.4 
Husband Unemployed at to 0.0485 28.6 0.0154 77.7 0.0039 179.8 0.9322 -2.1 
Wife Unemployed at to 0.1045 177.1 0.0084 -3.1 0.0015 9.3 0.8856 -7.0 
Both Unemployed 0.1343 256.2 0.0149 72.1 0.0043 205.8 0.8465 -11.1 
Husband Higher Education 0.0444 17.7 0.0050 -42.3 0.0009 -38.1 0.9497 -0.3 
Wife Higher Education 0.0259 -31.3 0.0066 -24.4 0.0022 57.4 0.9653 1.4 
Both Higher Education 0.0305 -19.2 0.0038 -56.4 0.0014 -2.5 0.9644 1.3 
Husband Part Time 0.0238 -36.8 0.0135 56.3 0.0013 -9.7 0.9614 1.0 
Wife Part Time 0.0884 134.4 0.0114 31.5 0.0023 61.7 0.8979 -5.7 
Both Part Time 0.0558 48.1 0.0178 105.6 0.0020 46.0 0.9243 -2.9 
Husband Public Sector 0.0227 -39.7 0.0168 93.7 0.0017 22.3 0.9588 0.7 
Wife Public Sector 0.0324 -14.0 0.0126 45.9 0.0015 7.8 0.9534 0.1 
Any Self-employed 0.0252 -33.2 0.0071 -18.5 0.0005 -66.5 0.9673 1.6 
Household Size = 4 0.0370 -2.0 0.0076 -12.5 0.0004 -72.5 0.9551 0.3 
Not Independent 0.0441 17.1 0.0146 68.2 0.0699 4882.9 0.8713 -8.5 
H. relative income = 75% 0.0453 20.1 0.0076 -12.4 0.0005 -66.4 0.9467 -0.6 
H. relative income = 25% 0.0314 -16.7 0.0099 14.1 0.0042 198.0 0.9545 0.2 
H. relative income = 0% 0.0261 -30.7 0.0113 30.2 0.0125 787.8 0.9501 -0.2 
W. relative income = 75% 0.0067 -82.2 0.0051 -41.5 0.0002 -85.2 0.9880 3.8 
W. relative income = 50% 0.0159 -57.9 0.0066 -23.5 0.0005 -61.5 0.9769 2.6 
W. relative income = 0% 0.0895 137.3 0.0113 30.7 0.0036 159.7 0.8956 -6.0 
Relative non-work income = 10% 0.0353 -6.4 0.0074 -14.2 0.0010 -31.6 0.9563 0.4 
Denmark 0.0162 -57.1 0.0095 9.2 0.0014 -1.2 0.9730 2.2 
Belgium 0.0301 -20.2 0.0200 130.5 0.0009 -39.4 0.9491 -0.3 
France 0.0090 -76.2 0.0506 483.4 0.0155 1002.2 0.9250 -2.9 
UK 0.0427 13.2 0.0123 41.4 0.0038 173.8 0.9412 -1.2 
Ireland 0.1297 244.1 0.0063 -27.1 0.0056 301.7 0.8583 -9.9 
Italy 0.1364 261.9 0.0364 320.3 0.0130 823.0 0.8142 -14.5 
Greece 0.0848 124.8 0.0158 81.9 0.0053 274.6 0.8942 -6.1 
Spain 0.0737 95.4 0.0053 -39.0 0.0072 411.8 0.9138 -4.0 
Portugal 0.0299 -20.6 0.0091 4.6 0.0010 -25.6 0.9599 0.8 
Note: the reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them with higher education, none 
unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working lifes at 18, with no part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-
employed, living independently and without any other family member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are : 25% 
wife income, 50% husband income and no capital income. 
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Figure 2.a. Male labour force status by country in 1995. 
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Figure 2.b Female labour force status by country in 1995. 
+ unemployment 
Denmark Holland Belgium 
France U.K. Ireland 
Greece Portugal 
16 25 35 45 55 65 16 25 35 45 55 65 16 25 35 45 55 65 
women, 1995 
36 
Figure 3.a. Male labour force transitions in a three state model in EU12 by age. 
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Figure 3.b. Female labour force transitions in a three state model in EVI2 by age. 
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Figure 4.a. Male hazard out of the labour force by country and age. 
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Figure 4.b. Female hazard out of the labour force by country and age. 
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Figure 5. Male, Female and joint distribution of activities by age in EU12 in March 1994. 
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